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FOURTH AMENDMENT-MUST POLICE
KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE THEMSELVES
BEFORE KICKING IN THE DOOR OF
A HOUSE?
W'lson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Wilson v. Arkansas,' the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question of whether an unannounced entry by police
armed with a search warrant violates the Fourth Amendment.2 This
question had been left unanswered for over thirty years since the
Court's ambiguous plurality decision in Ker v. California in 1963.3 The
Court in Wilson answered the question tentatively, holding that under
some circumstances an unannounced entry by police acting under the
authority of a search warrant will violate the Fourth Amendment.
4
The Court's holding was based entirely on historical grounds. After
reviewing the history of the knock-and-announce rule,5 the Court
held that police failure to announce their authority and purpose prior
to a forced entry is merely a factor in a Fourth Amendment reasona-
bleness determination.
6
This Note argues that the Court should have held that unan-
nounced entries are presumptively unreasonable under Fourth
Amendment standards. Police should be allowed to enter a home
only when they know that the occupants are already aware of the of-
ficers' authority and purpose, or when there is a reasonable suspicion,
1 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995).
2 The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
4 Won, 115 S. Ct. at 1918.
5 The knock-and-announce rule requires police officers serving an arrest or search
warrant at a home to knock, announce their authority and purpose, and wait for a reason-
able period of time before forcibly entering the home. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1994)
(codifying the common law knock-and-announce rule).
6 Wiz0ko 115 S.Ct. at 1918.
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based on specific articulable facts, that an announced entry would re-
sult in danger to the officers or destruction of evidence. After exam-
ining the history and purposes of the knock-and-announce rule, this
Note asserts that the Court improperly relied only on a historical anal-
ysis in its decision. By balancing the state's interest in unannounced
entries against the occupants' Fourth Amendment interests, this Note
concludes that the proposed rule would better protect the interests
served by the knock-and-announce rule.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
1. The Origins of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment was adopted as a response to the abu-
sive search and seizure practices used by the British government dur-
ing the American colonial period. 7 The colonists were particularly
concerned about broad, unparticularized searches performed under
the authority of general warrants. 8 General warrants authorized
searches for persons or papers not named specifically in the warrant.
The British government used general warrants in both England and
America. In England, general warrants were widely used to suppress
seditious publications. 9 One particularly influential incident involved
the North Briton, a series of pamphlets criticizing government policies
published anonymously by John Wilkes, a member of Parliament. 10
After a particularly critical issue of the pamphlet was published, the
Secretary of State issued a general warrant to search for the people
who published the pamphlets. I" Wilkes and others who had been
searched and arrested challenged the warrant issued against them.12
7 For the historical background of the Fourth Amendment, see generally JACOB W.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 1948 (1966); NELSON B. LASSON,
THE HIsTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CON-
STITuTION 13-106 (1937); William Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original
Meaning, 602-1791 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont College 1990).
8 See, e.g., LANDYNSE!, supra note 7, at 30-31.
9 Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 724 (1961). See also LANDVNSR1, supra note
7, at 20-30; LASSON, supra note 7, at 42.
10 LASSON, supra note 7, at 43-46.
11 The warrant involved in the North Briton incident authorized four messengers of the
Secretary of State "to make strict and diligent search for the authors, printers, and publish-
ers of a seditious and treasonable paper, entitled, The North Briton, No. 45 .... and them,
or any of them, having found, to apprehend and seize, together with their papers." Id. at
43. As the publication had been printed anonymously, the agents had complete discretion
in determining whom to arrest and what to seize. The four agents arrested forty-nine peo-
ple in the three days following the issuance of the warrant. Id. at 43-44.
12 Id. at 45.
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In Wilkes v. Wood, the King's Bench held the warrant illegal.'3
In colonial America, general warrants were used to ferret out
smugglers. 14 These warrants, called writs of assistance, were issued to
customs officials by the colonial courts.' 5 Writs of assistance com-
manded all subjects of the Crown to assist the officer executing the
writ.' 6 The writs authorized customs officials and their subordinates
to search anywhere they thought smuggled goods would be hidden
and to break open containers suspected of holding smuggled goods. 17
A customs official possessing a writ of assistance had "practically abso-
lute and unlimited" discretion as to how the writ could be executed1
8
A particularly offensive feature of these writs was that they served as
permanent search warrants, effective until six months after the death
of the reigning sovereign. 19 These writs inspired resentment through-
out the colonies, 20 and after the revolution, seven states enacted con-
stitutional prohibitions against general warrants.
21
Although these abuses were the primary targets of the Framers of
the Fourth Amendment,22 the congressional debates on the Fourth
Amendment clearly demonstrate that the focus of the Amendment
extended beyond general warrants.23 As originally proposed in Con-
gress, the Fourth Amendment only protected against general war-
rants.24 However, during the debates on the Amendment, objections
13 19 How. St. Tr. 1153, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (KB. 1763). The North Briton incident
sparked a series of cases in which the English courts spoke against the evils of general
warrants. The most influential of these cases was Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr.
1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K-B. 1765). LANDYNSKi, supra note 7, at 29. Entick has been long
recognized by the United States Supreme Court as a guide to the thoughts of the Framers
of the Fourth Amendment on unreasonable searches. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 626-27 (1886). To this day, the Court still relies on Entick in its cases on search and
seizure. E.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989).
14 LANDYNSKI, supra note 7, at 30.
15 Id. at 32.
16 Id. at 22.
17 LASSON, supra note 7, at 54. One of the few restrictions on the discretion of the
customs official was that buildings could only be searched during the daytime. A civil
officer also had to be present when the writ was executed. Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 LANDuosvi, supra note 7, at 36-37. Writs of assistance were primarily used in Massa-
chusetts, and outrage over them was an important factor in stirring up revolutionary senti-
ment in that colony. Id. at 31, 37.
21 LAssoN, supra note 7, at 79-82. The states were Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia. Id. at 82. In addition, Con-
necticut's constitution had a vague provision relating to illegal searches and seizures. Id. at
82 n.17.
22 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
23 See LASSON, supra note 7, at 100-03.
24 As originally proposed in the House, the Fourth Amendment read: "The right of the
people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, shall not be violated by
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to the narrow focus of the Amendment's protections were raised, and
the Amendment's final text contained a clause protecting against any
unreasonable search.
25
This history has persuaded the Supreme Court to recognize that the
Fourth Amendment's Unreasonable Search Clause protects rights be-
yond those protected by the Warrant Clause.2 6 Thus, the Court has
interpreted the Unreasonable Search Clause to apply even to searches
made with a warrant.2 7
2. The Reasonableness Standard
The standard of reasonableness, based on the Unreasonable
Search Clause, has emerged as the primary test of whether a given
search is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.28 The reason-
ableness standard first surfaced in the Court's Fourth Amendment
cases of the late 1940s and early 1950s, such as United States v. Rabino-
witz,29 where the Court used reasonableness to determine the proper
scope of a search incident to an arrest. However, the Court did not
fully develop the doctrine until Camara v. Municipal Court" and Terry
v. Ohio,S1 where the Court used reasonableness to fashion broad ex-
warrants issuingwithout probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." LAsSON,
supra note 7, at 101 (emphasis added).
25 The second draft of the Amendment changed the wording to:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issuing with-
out probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.(emphasis added). This provision still clearly prohibits only the acts described in the
original proposal, as noted during the Congressional debate:
Mr. Benson objected to the words "by warrants issuing." This declaratory provision
was good as far as it went, but he thought it was not sufficient, he therefore proposed to
alter it so as to read "and no warrant shall issue."
The question was put on this motion, and lost by a considerable majority.
Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 783 (1789)) (emphasis added).
Though the proposal was originally defeated in the House, Benson's change was even-
tually adopted and became the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 102. For the final text of the
Fourth Amendment, see supra note 2.
26 Payton, 445 U.S. at 584-85. See also LAsSON, supra note 7, at 103. But see LANDYNSKI,
supra note 7, at 43 (arguing that the Unreasonable Search Clause only emphasizes the
Warrant Clause).
27 The Court has found searches conducted under proper warrants unreasonable. E.g.,
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 763-66 (1985) (holding the court-ordered surgical removal of
a bullet from a suspect unreasonable); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (holding
a search for personal papers under warrant unreasonable).
28 1 JOHN WESLEY HALL,JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1:19, at 27 (1991).
29 339 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950), overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
30 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) (reasonableness used to exempt municipal inspectors
from the warrant requirement).
31 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (applying reasonableness to create reasonable suspicion standard
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ceptions to the warrant requirement. Most cases invoking the reason-
ableness standard have involved warrantless searches and seizures, but
the Court also applies the standard to cases involving valid warrants.
3 2
The reasonableness standard balances a state's legitimate govern-
mental interests against the extent to which a questioned practice in-
trudes upon an individual's Fourth Amendment interests.
33
Reasonableness is determined based on the facts known to the police
at the time the intrusion occurs.3 4 In evaluating the legitimacy of the
governmental interests involved, the Court considers the degree to
which law enforcement will be hindered if a practice is not allowed.
3 5
The Court may also look to prevailing rules in individual jurisdictions
and the historical pedigree of a practice to determine reasonable-
ness.36 While the Court will not merely rubber stamp a practice be-
cause it is long established, a "clear consensus among the States" is
carefully considered by the Court.3 7 Likewise, the judgment of Con-
gress that a practice is reasonable also carries weight with the Court.38
B. THE PURPOSES OF THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE REQUIREMENT
Like the Fourth Amendment, the knock-and-announce rule pro-
tects the security, privacy, and property interests of people in their
homes. The knock-and-announce rule requires that police officers
give notice of both their authority and purpose to the occupants of a
for justifying police "stop and frisk" searches).
32 E.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1980) (applying reasonableness to a
search conducted pursuant to a valid warrant); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547
(1978) (same).
33 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1979). The balancing of interests under
the rubric of reasonableness is the "key principle" of the Fourth Amendment. Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981). The Fourth Amendment protects people's "pri-
vacy, dignity, and security" interests against "certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of
the Government or those acting at their direction." Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n.,
489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989).
34 U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984).
35 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980); United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411, 417 (1976). The unavailability of a practice must seriously hinder law enforce-
ment for the Court to be swayed. See id. Mere inconvenience to law enforcement interests
will not move the Court. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981). The
Court looks at local police department policies to determine the extent to which depart-
ments actually rely on a particular practice. Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985).
36 Garner, 471 U.S. at 13-18; Watson, 423 U.S. at 420-22. The degree to which the Court
has relied on history for determining reasonableness is discussed infra at notes 215-246 and
accompanying text.
37 Payton, 445 U.S. at 590, 600 (clear consensus of states particularly helpful "when the
constitutional standard is as amorphous as the word 'reasonable' and when custom and
contemporary norms necessarily play such a large role in the constitutional analysis").
38 Id. at 590.
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residence to be searched. 39 Before breaking and entering the prem-
ises to search, officers must also give the occupants a reasonable op-
portunity to voluntarily allow the police to enter.40 Police officers
must follow the knock-and-announce rule regardless of whether they
have a warrant, because the knock-and-announce rule serves several
important purposes. 41
First, the rule reduces the risk of violence during a police entry.
A forced, unannounced entry is "conducive to a violent confrontation
between the occupant and individuals who enter his home without
proper notice."42 Unannounced entries put the officers involved at
risk of being shot by frightened homeowners. 43 Moreover, the rule
also reduces the risk to innocent persons who may be in the house at
the time of the search.44 Second, the rule protects the privacy inter-
39 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVrE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.8(c) (3d ed. 1996). The rule also ap-
plies to arrests. Id. § 6.2.
40 Courts have been reluctant to adopt bright line standards as to what constitutes a
reasonable amount of time. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1261-62 (Utah 1993). If
exigent circumstances exist, courts have found very short periods of time sufficient to com-
ply with the rule. E.g., People v. Saechao, 544 N.E.2d 745, 750 (Ill. 1989) (five to ten
seconds; officers were "in a vulnerable position" after unlatched door opened from force
of the officer's knock, and officers heard no response after knocking and loudly announc-
ing their presence). When exigent circumstances do not exist, courts will generally find
such short periods of time insufficient. E.g., People v. Polidori, 476 N.W.2d 482, 485
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 298 (1992) (three to six second wait insuffi-
cient in absence of exigent circumstances).
41 E.g., Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958) (applying knock-and-announce rule
to a warrantless entry); United States v. Becker, 23 F.3d 1537 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying
knock-and-announce rule to an entry pursuant to a warrant).
42 Duke v. Superior Court, 461 P.2d 628, 633 (Cal. 1969) (en banc).
43 At common law, courts worried that unannounced officers would be mistaken for
trespassers.
[I]f no previous demand is made, how is it possible for a party to know what the object
of the person breaking open the door may be? He has a right to consider it as an
aggression on his private property, which he will be justified in resisting to the utmost.
Launock v. Brown, 2 B. & Ald. 591, 594, 106 Eng. Rep. 482, 483 (K.B. 1819). More re-
cently,Justice Jackson pointed out the dangers involved in modem unannounced entries:
The method of enforcing the law exemplified by this search is one which not only
violates legal rights of defendant but is certain to involve the police in grave troubles if
continued. That it did not do so on this occasion was due to luck more than to fore-
sight. Many homeowners in this crime-beset city doubtless are armed. When a woman
sees a strange man, in plain clothes, prying up her bedroom window and climbing in,
her natural impulse would be to shoot. A plea of justifiable homicide might result
awkwardly for enforcement officers. But an officer seeing a gun being drawn on him
might shoot first. Under the circumstances of this case, I should not want the task of
convincing a jury that it was not murder. I have no reluctance in condemning as
unconstitutional a method of law enforcement so reckless and so fraught with danger
and discredit to the law enforcement agencies themselves.
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460-61 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
44 Duke, 461 P.2d at 632-33. For example, Wilson's eleven year old son and another
couple were in the living room of the house when the police entered. Brief for Respon-
dent at 3, Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995) (No. 94-5707).
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ests of the occupants of the house. 45 Although there is obviously no
right to refuse entry to an officer armed with a valid search warrant, 46
the occupants of a house to be searched have a privacy interest in
activities not subject to the warrant.47 Additionally, making the police
request entry minimizes the possibility of a forced entry into the
wrong home,48 and legitimizes the intrusion.49 Third, requiring po-
lice to knock and announce before forcibly entering a residence pro-
tects the homeowner's property interests.50 A person should be given
the opportunity to voluntarily submit to a search before having his
property damaged.5' When there is no property damage,5 2 courts
tend to be more lenient towards police noncompliance with the an-
nouncement rule.
53
C. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE RULE
1. English Common Law Predecessors
The common law knock-and-announce rule was first judicially
recognized in 1603.54 In Semayne's Case, the Court of King's Bench
stated:
45 Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589 (1968); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
301, 313 (1957).
46 State v. Valentine, 504 P.2d 84 (Or. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 948 (1973).
47 Allowing a minute for the occupants of the house to answer can prevent them from
being embarrassed by a police entry. For example, in Hall v. Shipley, 932 F.2d 1147 (6th
Cir. 1991), officers used a battering ram to enter Hall's home when they heard noise from
inside that they thought was the sound of evidence being destroyed. What they actually
heard was Hall having sex with his girlfriend. Hall was detained in the nude. Id. at 1148.
48 United States v. Lockett, 919 F.2d 585, 588 (9th Cir. 1990).
49 People v. Casias, 563 P.2d 926, 933 n.12 (Colo. 1977) (en banc) ("Advising a citizen
whose house is about to be searched pursuant to a warrant gives additional legitimacy to
the procedure in the eyes of the citizen.").
50 Lord Mansfield gave this eloquent defense of the knock-and-announce rule:
The ground of it is this; that otherwise the consequences would be fatal: for it would
leave the family within, naked and exposed to thieves and robbers. It is much better
therefore, says the law, that you should wait for another opportunity, than do an act of
violence, which may probably be attended with such dangerous consequences.
Lee v. Ganser, 1 Cowp. 1, 6-7; 98 Eng. Rep. 935, 938 (K.B. 1774).
51 2 LAFAVE, supra note 39, § 4.8(a). See also State v. Carufel, 314 A.2d 144, 147 (R.I.
1974).
52 For example, if entry is achieved with a pass key or via a ruse.
53 The "mild exigency" cases bear this out. A lower showing of exigency can sometimes
justify noncompliance with the knock-and-announce rule when entry can be achieved with-
out destruction of property. See United States v. Von Willie, 59 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1995)
(officer, fearing violence, entered through partially opened door prior to announcement);
United States v. Sagaribay, 982 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1993) (officers, fearing that heroin inside
the house would be destroyed, entered with a passkey while simultaneously announcing
authority and purpose). See also 2 LAFAV E, supra note 37, § 4.8(e).
54 See Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603). The origins of the
rule substantially predate Semayne's Case. The case relies on statutes that date back to the
year 1275. E.g., 1 Edw., ch. 17.
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In all cases when the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open)
may break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do other execu-
tion of the K[ing]'s process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he
breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make re-
quest to open doors.., for the law without default in the owner abhors
destruction or breaking of any house (which is for the habitation and
safety of man) by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue
to the party, when no default is in him; for perhaps he did not know of
the process, of which, if he had notice, it is to be presumed that he
would obey it .... 55
The broad holding of Semayne's Case was adopted by the foremost
English treatise writers of the period.56 While there was argument
among the treatise writers over the circumstances in which doors
could be broken at all,57 there was no disagreement over the rule that
when doors were to be broken, even on a warrant for a felony, an-
nouncement was a precondition to the breaking.58 The rule was also
present in books intended for those executing such warrants. 59 The
presence of announcement requirements in these books strongly sug-
gests that announcement was a widespread practice at common law
during the Eighteenth Century.
The first reported application of the announcement requirement
in a criminal case was in Curtis' Case.60 In that case, the Court of
King's Bench held that officers who were serving an arrest warrant for
breach of the peace could break down doors after "having demanded
admittance and given due notice of their warrant."61 The court did
55 Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195-96 (citations omitted).
56 See 1 JOSEPH CHrrTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 52-56 (1819); 4
EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 177; MICHAEL FOSTER, CROWN LAW 320
(3d ed. 1792); 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 583; 2 MATTHEW
HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 116-17; 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 138-39 (6th ed. 1738).
57 For example, there was a disagreement over whether an officer could break down
doors to arrest upon "probable suspicion" of a felony. Coke and Hawkins thought officers
could not do so, while Hale and Blackstone thought officers could. See G. Robert Blakey,
The Rule of Announcement And Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. California,
112 U. PA. L. REX'. 499, 502 (1964).
58 For example, Hawkins said:
[tihe law doth never allow of such extremities but in cases of necessity; and therefore,
That no one can justify the breaking open another's doors to make an arrest, unless
he first signify to those in the house the cause of his coming, and request them to give
him admittance.
HAWKINS, supra note 56, at 138. See also 2 HALE, supra note 56, at 116-17 ("If ajustice of the
peace issues a warrant to apprehend a felon, who is in his own house, and after notice of
the warrant and request to open the door it is refused or neglected to be done, the officer
may break open the door to take him. .. ").
59 E.g., 1 JOHN BURN, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND THE PARISH OFFICER 121-22 (17th ed.
1793) (follows Hawkins).
60 Fost. 135, 168 Eng. Rep. 67 (F.B. 1757).
61 Id., 168 Eng. Rep. at 68.
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not require the officers to recite any particular formula to satisfy the
notice requirement. Rather, the court held that "it is sufficient that
the party hath notice, that the officer cometh not as a mere trespasser,
but claiming to act under a proper authority .... -62
The English courts affirmed this holding in subsequent criminal
cases. 63 Although no early English case specifically excludes felony
cases from the announcement rule, the extent to which the rule ap-
plied in felony cases remains unclear.64 An early nineteenth-century
decision reserved the question of applying the notice requirement to
felonies.65 In light of the unqualified comments found in contempo-
rary treatises, however, it appears that announcement did occur in
most, if not all, cases of criminal arrests in the home, regardless of
whether the suspect was wanted for a felony or other crime.
2. Transplanting the Rule to America
The knock-and-announce rule was embraced in the United States
prior to the ratification of the Constitution.66 Between 1777 and
1786, ten states passed statutes requiring announcement prior to the
forcible entry of a dwelling to conduct a search. 67 For example, a
1782 New York statute allowed a constable with a search warrant "to
break open the doors of any house or outhouse, for the purpose of
making any [contraband] search, if admittance shall be refused."68 In
addition, popular legal manuals for justices of the peace published in
America at the time of the Fourth Amendment's adoption also re-
quired announcement prior to a forcible entry to arrest. 69
62 Id.
63 E.g., Launock v. Brown, 2 B. & Aid. 592, 593, 106 Eng. Rep. 482, 483 (K.B. 1819);
Burdett v. Abbot, 14 East. 1, 162-63, 104 Eng. Rep. 501, 563 (K.B. 1811).
64 Blakey, supra note 57, at 503.
65 See Launock, 106 Eng. Rep. at 483. The Court of King's Bench split on the issue of
applying announcement to felonies in Launock. ChiefJudge Abbott stated that "[il t is not
at present necessary for us to decide how far, in the case of a person charged with felony, it
would be necessary to make a previous demand of admittance before you could justify
breaking open the outer door of his house...." Id. However, Judge Bailey did not limit
his comments to misdemeanors: "[E]ven in the execution of criminal process, you must
demand admittance before you can justify breaking open the outer door." Id.
66 Writs of assistance were apparently executed with a notice requirement. See Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 51 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Note, An-
nouncement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L. J. 139, 144-45 (1970).
67 2 Cuddihy, supra note 7, at 1513. Statutes prohibiting unannounced forced entries
were passed in Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia. See id. at 151-52 n.297-
300 for citations.
68 Act of April 13, 1782, ch. 39, § 3, 1 N.Y. ST. LAws 480.
69 2 Cuddihy, supra note 7, at 1511. Cuddihy believes that all such manuals required
the knock-and-announce rule, and he cites three examples: CONDUCTOR GENERALis, THE
SOUTH CAROLNAJUSTICE, and THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF AJUSTICE OF THE PEACE. Id. at
1996] 1237
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In America, announcement was the general rule for forcible en-
tries into homes. 70 Early American cases show that announcement
was made in cases ranging from minor infractions to serious crimes.
71
For example, in State v. Shaw,72 officers announced themselves prior
to a forced entry on a warrant for lewd conduct. Announcement was
also made in cases involving entry pursuant to a search warrant.
73
Even service of a warrant for treason, a capital offense, was preceded
by a demand for entry.74 Although no cases held a search pursuant
to a warrant illegal because of a failure to give notice prior to entry, in
McLennon v. Richardson,75 a warrantless entry to arrest was held illegal
in part because of an officer's failure to announce prior to entry.76 In
light of the comments found in early cases, the lack of cases declaring
an unannounced search illegal is probably due more to the fact that
officers did generally announce their authority and purpose before
entering, rather than to the non-existence of an announcement policy
in the courts.
77
Among the early cases, only Hawkins v. Commonwealth78 rejected
the knock-and-announce policy in criminal cases per se. In Hawkins,
officers broke into a house to serve an arrest warrant.79 The Kentucky
Court of Appeals thought that announcement gave offenders the op-
portunity to escape capture, and therefore did not require announce-
ment prior to a forced entry.80 On the other hand, in the few other
early cases where notice was held unnecessary prior to a forced entry,
1511-12. The first two of these reprint Hawkins' emphatic statement, cited supra note 58.
2 Cuddihy, supra note 7, at 1511.
70 Blakey, supra note 57, at 504-08 (collecting cases).
71 Cases involving announcement by an officer serving criminal process includeJacobs
v. Measures, 79 Mass. 74 (1859) and Barnard v. Bartlett, 64 Mass. 501 (1852).
72 1 Root 134 (Conn. 1789).
73 E.g., Chipman v. Bates, 15 Vt. 51 (1843); Bell v. Clapp, 10Johns. 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1813).
74 Kelsey v. Wright involved a forced entry on a warrant for treason. 1 Root 83 (Conn.
1783). The entry was preceded by an announcement of purpose and a demand for entry,
which was refused. The court held that the entry was legal. Id
75 81 Mass. 74 (1860).
76 McLennon involved a warrantless, unannounced entry for liquor and Sabbath viola-
tions observed by an officer. Id. The court held the officer's warrantless entry illegal, and
then said:
Besides, he could not break open the door without first "demanding entrance"; the answer does
not aver that any demand for entrance was made; nor does the proof show that any
such demand was made as to give the plaintiff notice that the defendant, as an officer
of the law, sought an entrance into his premises.
Id. at 77-78 (emphasis added).
77 Blakey, supra note 57, at 506-07.
78 53 Ky. 318 (1854).
79 Id. at 320.
80 Id. at 319-20. However, the court did require compliance with the knock-and-an-
nounce rule when officers were serving civil process. Id. at 319.
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the courts merely found the rule inapplicable under the particular
circumstances presented in the case.8'
D. THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE REQUIREMENT TODAY
8 2
Today, forty-three states and the federal government recognize
the knock-and-announce rule.83 The federal government adopted the
knock-and-announce rule by statute in 1917.84 Thirty-three states and
the District of Columbia have statutes requiring prior notice for a for-
cible entry either to arrest or search.8 5 Nine other states impose the
knock-and-announce rule by judicial decision.86
American courts have developed three exceptions to the an-
nouncement rule that apply in exigent circumstances: (1) apprehen-
81 All of these cases fit very clearly into the "exigent circumstances" exceptions which
apply to the knock-and-announce rule today. E.g., Androscoggin R.R. Co. v. Richards, 41
Me. 233 (1856) (no notice given when search warrant served on an empty building); Howe
v. Butterfield, 58 Mass. 302, 305 (1849) (defendant had no "cause to suppose, that any
person was in the house," and those inside were there in order to resist execution of pro-
cess; "[a] demand, therefore, would have been useless...."); Allen v. Martin, 10 Wend. 300
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833) (no notice given, officer in fresh pursuit of offender).
82 See genera/yJames 0. Pearson,Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes Compliance with Knock-
and-Announce Rule in Search of Private Premises-State Cases, 70 A.LR.3d 217 (1976 & Supp.
1995); Marvin 0. Meier, Annotation, What Constitutes Viwlation of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 Requiring
Federal Officer to Give Notice of His Authority and Purpose Prior to Breaking Open Door or Window
or Other Part of House to Execute Search Warrant, 21 A.L.R. FED. 820 (1974 & Supp. 1995).
83 SeeJennifer M. Goddard, Note, The Destruction of Evidence Exception to the Knock-and-
Announce Rule: A Call for the Protection of Fourth Amendment Rights, 75 B.U. L. REv. 449, 458-59
(1995) (collecting state statutes and cases).
84 Espionage Act of 1917, Tit. XI, § 8-9, 40 Stat. 217, 228-29 (enacted June 15, 1917)
(now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3109). The original requirement was in two parts. The two
sections read:
§ 8. The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any
part of a house, or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his
authority and purpose, he is refused admittance.
§ 9. He may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, for the
purpose of liberating a person who, having entered to aid him in the execution of the
warrant, is detained therein, or when necessary for his own liberation.
Id. Though the measure was passed as a part of an espionage act, Congress intended the
rule to apply beyond espionage cases. See Giles v. United States, 284 F. 208 (1st Cir. 1922);
see also Charles P. Garcia, Note, The Knock-and-Announce Rule: A New Approach to the Destruc-
tion-of-EvidenceException, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 685, 690 (1993) (outlining congressional intent
on knock-and-announce provisions of the Espionage Act of 1917).
The two sections were condensed into the current 18 U.S.C. § 3109 in 1948. Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 820. The current code reads:
§ 3109. Breaking doors or windows for entry or exit
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part
of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his
authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself
or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1994).




sion of peril, (2) useless gesture, and (3) destruction of evidence. The
oldest of these is the apprehension of peril exception.8 7 The excep-
tion is triggered when officers executing a warrant have a reasonable
belief that an announcement prior to entry will increase the likeli-
hood of injury to either themselves or others. Modern courts are gen-
erally sympathetic to the police when the police know the suspect is
armed and the surrounding circumstances indicate danger.88 How-
ever, the fact that a suspect is known to have a weapon is not enough
on its own to trigger the exception. 89 Announcement is excused
when, in addition to knowledge that the occupant of a house is
armed, the police are investigating a violent crime,90 or have specific
knowledge that a suspect has used a weapon criminally or threatened
to use a weapon to avoid arrest.91 At the outer limits of the exception,
courts sometimes allow entries when the police do not know if a sus-
pect is armed, but the circumstances at the scene are sufficiently
87 The earliest example of the exception is White & Wiltsheire, 2 Rolle 137, 81 Eng.
Rep. 709 (K.B. 1619) (allowing sheriff to break down plaintiff's door when sheriffs bailiffs
had been imprisoned in the plaintiff's dwelling on a previous attempt to seize the plain-
tiff). The earliest use of the exception in America occurred in Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166
(1822). In that case, an unannounced entry into Read's home was justified on the basis of
Read's threats to resist arrest with a gun. Id. at 170. See generally Kemal A. Mericli, The
Apprehension of Peril Exception to the Knock-and-Announce Rule, 16 SEARCH AND SEIZURE L. REP.
129 (1989); Annotation, Sufficiency of Showing of Reasonable Belief of Danger to Officers or Others
Excusing Compliance with "Knock and Announce" Requirement-State Criminal Cases, 17
A.L.R.4th 301 (1982).
88 Trosper v. State, 721 P.2d 134, 135 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (requiring only "mild
indication of exigency" under this exception). Mild exigencies are likely to be sufficient
when the entry can be accomplished without destruction of property, police have partially
complied with the rule, and the occupant of the home arguably knows that the people at
the door are police. 2 LAFAvE, supra note 39, § 4.8(e). See, e.g., United States v. Kovac, 795
F.2d 1509, 1513 (9th Cir. 1986) (officers saw defendant move away from the door after
they knocked), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987).
89 See United States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541 (8th Cir.) (unannounced entry illegal even
though police knew suspect had weapons in house, because police had no indication that
suspect was violent or inclined to use the weapons), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 363 (1994);
Poole v. United States, 630 A.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. App. 1993) (evidence that a suspect has a
weapon "insufficient," police must also show reason to believe "there was a realistic possi-
bility that the occupant or occupants would use the weapons against them"), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 160 (1994). But see United States v. Buckley, 4 F.3d 552, 558 (7th Cir. 1993)
(unannounced entry legal where "the officers knew that the defendants possessed a pit
bull and firearms"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1084 (1994).
90 E.g., Poole, 630 A.2d at 1109 (fact that police were investigating an armed robbery,
and suspect had been charged with assaulting a police officer excused delay of only ten
seconds after announcement prior to forcible entry); Power v. State, 605 So. 2d 856, 862-63
(Fla. 1992) (invoking exception because police were investigating a murder, and the sus-
pect had committed armed robbery of a deputy, and also had used a gun or a knife in
several rapes), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1037 (1993).
91 People v. Hardin, 535 N.E.2d 1044, 1045-46 (Il. App. Ct 1989) (officers had previ-




The second exception to the knock-and-announce rule is the
"useless gesture" exception.93 Courts regard announcement as a "use-
less gesture" when the occupants of the house already have notice of
the officers' purpose and authority.94 Thus, if the police are in hot
pursuit of a suspect, notice is not required. 95 Similarly, announce-
ment is not required when police know a dwelling is vacant or the
occupants are not home.96 Where the occupants' conduct at the
scene of the entry is used to justify an unannounced entry under the
useless gesture exception, courts generally follow the Supreme
Court's guidelines from Miller v. United States.97 The Miller test pro-
vides that officers need to be "virtually certain" that the occupants of a
house are aware of the officers' authority and purpose. 98 Relevant
facts justifying a "virtually certain" belief include a suspect's knowl-
edge that the police are looking for him,99 the police noticing that the
house's occupants observed their arrival, 00 and the sound of people
running from the door.101
The third exception to the knock-and-announce rule is known as
the destruction of evidence exception.10 2 This exception allows police
to forego announcement if they have "reasonable cause to believe"
that announcement would "endanger the successful execution of the
92 See State ex reLJuvenile Dept. of Mulmomah Cty. v. Qutub, 706 P.2d 962, 964-66 (Or.
Ct. App.) (suspect had "vowed not to return to prison," and was considered dangerous),
review denied, 710 P.2d 147 (Or. 1985).
93 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 310 (1958).
94 The useless gesture exception stems from the notion that if the occupants realize the
purpose of the police visit, the purpose of the knock-and-announce rule has been satisfied.
95 E.g., United States v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cis-
neros, 448 F.2d 298, 304 (9th Cir. 1971). This exception was recognized at common law.
See Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 198 (K.B. 1603) (the privilege of the house "shall
not extend to protect any person who flies to his house... to escape the ordinary process
of law. .. ."); Allen v. Martin, 10 Wend. 300, 304 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833).
96 Payne v. United States, 508 F.2d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir.) (owner not home), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 933 (1975); State v. Iverson, 364 N.W.2d 518, 526 (S.D. 1985) ("The demand for
admittance and the notice of authority and purpose required by the statute presupposes
the presence of a human being in the premises.").
97 357 U.S. 301 (1958). See, e.g., United States v. Kulcsar, 586 F.2d 1283, 1286 (8th Cir.
1978); United States v. Seelig, 498 F.2d 109, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1974); Hair v. United States,
289 F.2d 894, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1961); State v. Hatcher, 322 N.W.2d 210, 218 (Minn. 1982).
98 Miller, 357 U.S. at 310. See infra notes 109-30 and accompanying text.
99 E.g United States v. Guyon, 717 F.2d 1536, 1538-39 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1067 (1984).
100 E.g., United States v. Singleton, 439 F.2d 381, 386 (3rd Cir. 1971).
101 See United States v.James, 764 F.2d 885, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See also Singleton, 439
F.2d at 386. Suspicious noises inside a dwelling are relevant to the other exceptions, partic-
ularly the destruction of evidence exception.
102 See generally Garcia, supra note 84; Goddard, supra note 83.
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warrant." 10 3 As a result of the controversy caused by the application of
this exception in drug searches, 0 4 courts have strongly disagreed on
the requisite showing of risk required to trigger this exception.
10 5
Some courts have required proof that officers were aware of specific
facts at the scene that implied the destruction of evidence.' 0 6 A small
minority of courts have held that exigency can be shown based solely
on the type of evidence sought under the warrant.'0 7 Thus, some
courts have held that when a house has "normal plumbing facilities"
and officers are looking for small quantities of drugs, police may pre-
sume exigent circumstances exist which will obviate the necessity of
complying with the knock-and-announce rule.'08
E. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE RULE
The Supreme Court first considered the knock-and-announce is-
sue in Miller v. United States.10 9 In that case, officers" 0 without a war-
rant arrived at William "Blue" Miller's door, intending to arrest
him.11' The police knocked at the door and a voice from within re-
plied, "who's there?"1' 12 In a low voice, the officers responded, "po-
lice." ' 3 Miller opened the chained door and asked the police what
they were doing there, but before the police could respond, he tried
103 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 220.3(3) (1975).
104 See Garcia, supra note 84, at 698.
105 Commonwealth v. Scalise, 439 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Mass. 1982); 2 LAFAVE, supra note
39, § 4.8(d). For a complete breakdown of the standards preferred by state and federal
courts, see Garcia, supra note 84, at 698-99.
106 E.g., United States v. Shugart, 889 F. Supp. 963, 976-77 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (rejecting
the use of the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule in knock-and-an-
nounce cases); State v. Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1994).
107 E.g., United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 873 F.2d 7, 9 (lst Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 891 (1989) (drugs); People v. DeLago, 213 N.E.2d 659, 661 (N.Y. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 963 (1966) (gambling "flash paper").
108 E.g., State v. Stevens, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2245 (1995);
United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 849-50 (8th Cir. 1992). The logic is that many drug
offenders attempt to flush their drugs down the toilet when they realize the police are
about to raid their home, so having plumbing in a house creates a risk of destruction of
evidence.
109 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
110 Six officers were involved in the investigation that led the police to Miller's house.
The officers included two from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department,
two from the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, and two Virginia State Police officers. One D.C.
officer and one Federal agent went to the door to make the arrest. Id. at 303 n.1.
111 Id. at 303. The officers were looking for $100 in marked money that had been used
by an informant to buy heroin from Arthur Shepherd, the brother of Miller's roommate
Bessie Byrd. The police had observed Shepherd enter Miller's basement apartment with
the money, but when Shepherd was arrested in a taxicab minutes after leaving the apart-
ment, he did not have the money. He had 100 capsules of heroin instead. Id. at 302-03.




to shut the door."14 The officers broke the door chain and entered
the apartment."15
Miller argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated
when the police entered without announcing their purpose." 6 How-
ever, the Supreme Court did not reach the constitutional issue. The
Court declared the arrest illegal, and suppressed the evidence found
during the search."17 They based their decision on the law of the Dis-
trict of Columbia," 8 which set up criteria to judge arrests "identical
with those embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 3109."11 9
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, explained that the knock-
and-announce rule is "deeply rooted in our heritage and should not
be given grudging application." 120 Justice Brennan suggested that
§ 3109 was a codification of the common law by Congress.' 21 The
Court then fashioned a very broad notice requirement under § 3109
from the unrestricted announcement requirement found in Semayne's
Case.'22 Under the Court's rule, officers must expressly announce
their purpose before breaking open a door.
123
Justice Brennan identified two purposes for the rule: the "rever-
ence of the law for the individual's right of privacy in his house" 24
and the safety of police.' 25 Justice Brennan noted that some state
cases had carved out exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule, 126
but reserved the question of whether exigent circumstances justified
noncompliance with § 3109.127 However, Justice Brennan did ex-
pressly acknowledge that an exception occurs when officers are "virtu-
ally certain" that a suspect already knows their purpose.' 28 In that
case, he noted, announcement would be a "useless gesture" and would
14 Id.
115 Id. at 303-04. Miller and Byrd were both arrested after the officers entered the apart-
ment. The officers found the marked $100 in their ensuing search. Id. at 304.
116 Blakey, supra note 57, at 517.
117 Miller, 357 U.S. at 31--14.
118 Miller, 357 U.S. at 306, 311 (citing Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir.
1949)).
119 Id. at 306.
120 Id. at 313.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 308-09.
123 Id. at 309.
124 Id. at 313.
125 Id. at 313 n.12 (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460-61 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
126 Id. at 309 (citing People v. Maddox, 294 P.2d 6 (Cal.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858
(1956) (destruction of evidence); Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822) (apprehension of
peril)).
127 Miller, 357 U.S. at 309.
128 Id. at 310.
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not be required. 129 Applying that standard, the Court found that the
officers were not "virtually certain" that Miller knew their purpose.
130
The Court stepped back from the Miller "virtually certain" stan-
dard in Ker v. California.131 In Ker, the police used a pass key to enter
Ker's apartment without knocking or announcing their identity or
purpose until inside.' 3 2 Although a 5-4 majority affirmed a lower
court ruling allowing materials gained in the search of Ker's apart-
ment into evidence, 3 3 the Ker Court split 4-4 on the question of
whether the entry was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
34
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Clark, held that the entry
was reasonable by Fourth Amendment standards.' 3 5 Justice Clark
evaluated the lawfulness of the arrest under California law.' 36 The
California courts recognized an exception to the knock-and-announce
rule for cases in which officers "in good faith" believe that evidence
129 Id.
130 Id. at 310-13. The Court held that Miller's attempt to close the door was an ambigu-
ous act, in light of the time of the entry, the fact that the police were not in uniform, and
the fact that his query of the officers' purpose went unanswered.
131 374 U.S. 23 (1963). Between Miler and Ker, the Court addressed the knock-and-
announce issue briefly in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The primary
issue in Wong Sun was whether statements gathered during a warrantless arrest conducted
without probable cause were admissible evidence. The government argued that the sus-
pect's conduct at the door when the police called gave the police probable cause to enter.
An officer knocked at the door of the suspect's laundromat (which also contained his
residence) two hours before the laundromat opened for business, and claimed to be a
customer. When the ruse failed, the officer identified himself as a narcotics officer, but
did not identify his purpose. The suspect slammed the door shut and ran away down the
hall. The officers broke open the door. Id. at 473-74. Justice Brennan, again writing for
the Court, held that the suspect's flight was ambiguous conduct, for "innocent people
caught in a web of circumstances frequently become terror-stricken." Id. at 483 n. 10 (quot-
ing Cooper v. United States, 218 F.2d 39, 41 (1953)).
132 Ker, 374 U.S. at 28. The police did not have a warrant.
133 Id. at 24-25.
134 Ker has more precedential value as the culmination of the process of incorporating
the Fourth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment that began in Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), and continued in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Ker
changed the standard by which state searches were judged from the "flexible concept of
'fundamental fairness,'" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to
the same standard of reasonableness by which federal searches arejudged. Ker, 374 U.S. at
33, 44-45 (Harlan, J., concurring). On this holding, the court voted 8-1, with only Justice
Harlan dissenting. Harlan did not believe the Fourth Amendment was applicable in this
case, and never reached the issue of whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, the Court split 4-4 on the issue of reasonableness.
135 Ker, 374 U.S. at 41.
136 CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West Supp. 1995) governs the execution of arrests in
California:
To make an arrest,... in all cases a peace officer, may break open the door or window
of the house in which the person to be arrested is, or in which... [he has] reasonable
grounds for believing the person to be, after having demanded admittance and ex-
plained the purpose for which admittance is desired.
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would be destroyed if they knocked and announced their purpose.13 7
Evaluating the facts of the case under this standard, the plurality con-
cluded that the arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment.138
However, the plurality made no attempt to probe the scope of exigent
circumstances which could justify a lack of announcement.
Justice Brennan 139 dissented from the part of the plurality opin-
ion upholding the search under the Fourth Amendment.140 Brennan
felt that all unannounced entries violate the Fourth Amendment un-
less they fit into three sharply limited exceptions to the announce-
ment rule:
(1) where the persons within already know of the officers' authority and
purpose, or (2) where the officers are justified in the belief that persons
within are in imminent peril of bodily harm, or (3) where those within
. .. are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers in the belief
that an escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted.141
Moreover, Justice Brennan sharply criticized a blanket exception al-
lowing unannounced police entries into homes based on past police
experience that "other narcotics suspects had responded to police an-
nouncements by attempting to destroy evidence," since that would
create an "exception that [would] devour the rule."142 Brennan be-
lieved that allowing an exception in the absence of an objective indi-
cation that the occupants of the home were aware of the police
presence would violate the presumption of innocence, since the entry
would have to be justified on the assumption that the occupants
would resist or further violate the law upon announcement. 43
The Court held an unannounced entry through an unlocked
door illegal in Sabbath v. United States.'44 In Sabbath, the Court consid-
ered the level of force required to qualify as a breaking under 18
137 People v. Maddox, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (Cal.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956). Justice
Traynorjustified the exception by reasoning that since § 844 is a codification of the com-
mon law, it should be interpreted in light of the common law exceptions for apprehension
of peril and destruction of evidence. Id.
138 Justification for the unannounced entry was found because of the officers' belief that
Ker had narcotics which were easily destroyed, and the officers' past experience that nar-
cotics suspects often tried to destroy evidence when police announced their presence. In
addition, "Ker's furtive conduct in eluding them shortly before the arrest was ground for
the belief that he might well have been expecting the police." Ker, 374 U.S. at 40. The
"furtive conduct" was a U-turn in the middle of a block while police were secretly following
his car home. Id. at 27. However, there was no indication that Ker was aware that the
police were following him at that point. Id. at 60-61 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
139 Justice Brennan's opinion was joined by ChiefJustice Warren, Justice Douglas, and
Justice Goldberg. Id. at 46.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 47.
142 Id. at 61.
143 Id. at 56.
144 391 U.S. 585 (1968).
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U.S.C. § 3109.145 Police knocked at Sabbath's door after sending an
informant in to deliver drugs to him. 146 Receiving no response, the
officers opened Sabbath's unlocked door and entered with their guns
drawn. 147 The Court concluded that the officers' entry was no less
intrusive than a violent entry.1 4 8
In the aftermath of Ker and Sabbath, commentators believed that
the court had constitutionalized the knock-and-announce rule.' 49
However, courts split as to whether the knock-and-announce rule was
constitutionally mandated.1 50 The Supreme Court denied certiorari
on this issue until Wilson v. Arkansas.'5 1
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Sharlene Wilson lived at 534 Oaklawn Street in Malvern, Arkan-
sas, with her fiancee, Bryson Jacobs.152 In late 1992, the Arkansas
State Police's Seventh Judicial District Drug Taskforce received infor-
mation of suspicious activity at the house. Consequently, its occupants
were targeted for investigation.
15 3
The police sent an informant to buy drugs from Wilson, who was
145 Id. at 587-88.
146 Id. at 587.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 590. The Court relied on People v. Rosales, 437 P.2d 489 (Cal. 1968) (en
banc), which held that an unannounced entry by the police through a closed and un-
locked door was illegal under CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West Supp. 1995). The Sabbath
Court also looked at common law sources for definitions of "break" in burglary, and
quoted with approval Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without A Warrant, 22 MICH. L. R:v. 798, 806
(1922): "What constitutes breaking seems to be the same as in burglary: lifting a latch,
turning a door knob, unhooking a chain or hasp, removing a prop to, or pushing open, a
closed door of entrance to the house-even a closed screen door.., is a breaking...
Sabbath, 391 U.S. at 590 n.5.
149 E.g., Garcia, supra note 84, at 693-94 (1993); Michael R. Sonnenrich & Stanley Ebner,
No-Knock and Nonsense, An Alleged Constitutional Problem, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 626, 643
(1970); Blakey, supra note 57, at 551 (1964).
150 E.g., United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 9 (9th. Cir. 1973) (yes, citing
Ker); State v. Dusch, 289 N.E.2d 515, 516-17 (Ind. 1972) (yes, citing Ker and Sabbath); State
v. Valentine, 504 P.2d 84, 85 (Or. 1972) (en banc) (yes, citing Ker), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
948 (1973); Commonwealth v. Newman, 240 A.2d 795, 799 (Pa. 1968) (same). But see, e.g.,
State v. Hider, 649 A.2d 14, 15 (Me. 1994) (no knock-and-announce requirement); State v.
Tyler, 840 P.2d 413, 427 (Kan. 1992) (same); Commonwealth v. Goggin, 587 N.E.2d 785,
787 (Mass. 1992) (knock-and-announce requirement based on the common law). The
Supreme Court contributed to the confusion by referring in Sabbath to "exceptions to any
possible constitutional rule relating to announcement and entry." Sabbath, 391 U.S. at 591
n.8 (italics added).
151 Compare Commonwealth v. Cundriff, 415 N.E.2d 172 (Mass. 1980) (not constitution-
ally required), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 973 (1981) with People v. Polidori, 476 N.W.2d 482
(Mich. App. 1991) (constitutionally required), app. denied, 479 N.W.2d 636 (Mich.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 298 (1992).




herself a former Drug Enforcement Administration informant. 54 On
November 22, 1992, the informant, wired with a body microphone,
went to the house and purchased marijuana from Jacobs. 155 The po-
lice recorded their conversations and the transaction. 156 On the next
day, the informant was wired again and sent to the house to buy
methamphetamine. 157 The informant was successful, and the second
transaction was also captured on tape.' 58
One month later, on December 30, 1992, the informant arranged
to purchase drugs from Wilson at a local convenience store.'5 9 This
time, however, the informant was not wired with any listening de-
vices.' 60 The informant went to the convenience store, where the po-
lice set up surveillance and waited for Wilson to arrive.' 61 When
Wilson arrived, the informant climbed in Wilson's pickup truck. 62
The informant testified that before the sale, Wilson asked her if she
was working for the police.' 63 The informant told Wilson she was
not.' 64 At trial, the informant claimed that Wilson threatened to kill
her if she was working for the police. 165 Wilson also allegedly made
her lift her shirt to check for listening devices.' 66 Satisfied that the
police were not involved, Wilson sold the informant marijuana.
167
However, Wilson did not have change for the informant, so the two
drove to another store to make change. 168 On the way, Wilson bran-
dished a semi-automatic pistol and again threatened to kill the in-
formant if she was working for the police. 169 After returning to the
first store, the informant met the police and told them about the
threat.170
The next day, the police officers applied for and obtained a war-
rant to search Wilson's home and to arrest both Wilson andJacobs.17 1
The affidavits filed with the search warrant detailed the transactions
154 Id.




159 Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1915 (1995).
160 Brief for Petitioner at 22, Wilson (No. 94-5707).










171 Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1915 (1995).
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and indicated thatJacobs had been previously convicted of arson and
firebombing.
172
The officers executed the search warrant later that afternoon.
173
When the officers arrived at Wilson's house, they found the main
door open, and could see Jacobs through the screen door.1 74 As they
opened the unlocked screen door and entered the home, the officers
identified themselves and announced that they had a warrant. 175 The
police did not have their weapons drawn as they entered the house.'
76
Once inside the house, the police found marijuana, methamphet-
amine, valium, drug paraphernalia, the handgun allegedly used to
threaten the informant, and ammunition. 177 The police also found
Wilson in the bathroom flushing marijuana down the toilet. 78 Wilson
and Jacobs were arrested and charged with delivery of a controlled
substance, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver,
and possession of drug paraphernalia.1 79 Wilson was also charged
with "terroristic threatening" for her threats against the informant. 180
Wilson and Jacobs were tried separately.181
Before trial, Wilson moved to suppress the evidence seized dur-
ing the search.182 Wilson claimed the search was invalid because the
police officers failed to knock and announce their purpose before en-
tering.183 The trial court summarily denied the motion to suppress. 1
84
A jury convicted Wilson on all charges, sentenced her to 32 years in
prison' 85 and fined her $11,000.186
Wilson appealed her conviction to the Arkansas Supreme
Court.18 7 She argued that the evidence gathered in the search should
have been suppressed because the Fourth Amendment requires of-
ficers to knock and announce their purpose prior to entering a resi-
dence. 188 The court found "no authority" for Wilson's theory, and
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.; Brief for Petitioner at 24, Wilson (No. 94-5707).
175 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1915.
176 Brief for Petitioner at 18, Wilson (No. 94-5707).
177 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1916.
178 Id.
179 Brief for Respondent at 3-4, Wilson. 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995) (No. 94-5707).
180 Id.
181 Brief for Petitioner at 26, Wilson (No. 94-5707).




186 Brief for Respondent at 4, Wilson (No. 94-5707).
187 Wilson v. State, 878 S.W.2d 755 (Ark. 1994).
188 Id. at 758.
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held that neither the Fourth Amendment, nor Arkansas law' 89 re-
quired officers to knock and announce before forcibly entering a
dwelling. ' 90 Therefore, the Arkansas Supreme Court, concluding that
suppression of the evidence was unwarranted, affirmed the convic-
don. 91 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether "the common-law 'knock-and-announce' principle
forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry."1 9 2
IV. SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S OPINION
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Thomas reversed the deci-
sion of the Arkansas Supreme Court and remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings, holding that the knock-and-announce rule is a
factor in determining whether a search is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.19 3 Justice Thomas began by noting that the
Court has looked at traditional protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures at the time of the Constitution's framing to de-
termine the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection against un-
reasonable searches.
9 4
Justice Thomas then traced the history of the knock-and-an-
nounce rule, noting that the early English common law courts recog-
nized the knock-and-announce principle.1 9 5 Thomas examined
several seventeenth and eighteenth-century English cases, particularly
Semayne's Case,'96 and found that the general rule in early common-
law courts was that "when the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be
not open) may break the party's house ... to do ... execution of the
189 ARK. R CRIM. PROc. 13.3(e) governs search warrant execution: "The executing of-
ficer, and other officers accompanying and assisting him, may use such degree of force,
short of deadly force, against persons, or to effect entry or to open containers as is reason-
ably necessary for the successful execution of the search warrant with all practicable safety."
190 Id.
191 Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1916 (1995).
192 Id.
193 Id. at 1915.
194 Id. at 1917. Thomas provides three examples to support this proposition. California
v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (analysis of the common law definitions of"seizure"
and "arrest" used to determine that a fleeing suspect has not been arrested until caught by
an officer); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418-420 (1976) (using common law
right of an officer to arrest without a warrant in holding that a warrantless arrest by a postal
inspector who has reason to believe that the arrestee has committed a felony is reason-
able); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) ("The Fourth Amendment is to be
construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was
adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and
rights of individual citizens.").
195 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1916-17.
196 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603).
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K[ing]'s process, if otherwise he cannot enter."1 97 However, the com-
mon law courts qualified this rule, requiring that before the sheriff
could break down the door, "he ought to signify the cause of his com-
ing, and to make request to open doors . . ., for the law without a
default in the owner abhors the destruction or breaking of any
house .... "198 The Court also cited several prominent eighteenth-
century commentators, including William Blackstone and Sir Matthew
Hale, to show that at the time the Constitution was framed, there was
general agreement in England on the importance of the knock-and-
announce principle. 199
The Court went on to show that the knock-and-announce rule
was carried over to American law from the common law.20 0 Further-
more, the Court noted that some states even passed statutes specifi-
cally adopting the common law view "that the breaking of the door of
a dwelling was permitted once admittance was refused."20 Thomas
concluded his historical analysis by showing that nineteenth-century
American courts also embraced the common law principle, 20 2 and
that prior Supreme Court cases acknowledged that the common law
"principle of announcement is 'embedded in Anglo-American
law."' 203 In light of the "longstanding common law endorsement of
the practice of announcement," the Court concluded that the "Fram-
ers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer's
entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assess-
ing the reasonableness of a seizure."20 4 Therefore, the Court held
that "in some circumstances an officer's unannounced entry into a
home might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."20 5
However, the Court did not address the circumstances that would
make an unannounced entry unreasonable by Fourth Amendment
standards. Instead, the Court expressly left that matter to the lower
courts.2 0 6 The Court did, however, emphasize that the "Fourth
Amendment's flexible requirement of reasonableness" does not man-
date that officers must knock and announce before every search.20 7
The Court observed that at common law, at the time of the framing,
197 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1916 (quoting Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195).
198 Id. (quoting Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195).




203 Id. at 1918 (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958)).
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 1919.
207 Id. at 1918.
1250 [Vol. 86
UNANNOUNCED POLICE ENTRIES
the announcement rule had not been conclusively extended to felony
cases, though the rule eventually expanded to cover felony arrests.208
The Court continued with a battery of nineteenth-century cases deal-
ing with common law exceptions to the knock-and-announce require-
ment.20 9 Justice Thomas concluded that although an unannounced
search may be unconstitutional, countervailing law enforcement inter-
ests can establish that an unannounced entry may be reasonable.2 10
The Court refused to consider the State's argument that the of-
ficers had a reasonable fear for their safety and that prior announce-
ment would create an unreasonable risk that the petitioner would
destroy evidence.21' Justice Thomas noted that the Arkansas Supreme
Court had not ruled on the sufficiency of these issues, and left the
issue for the state court to decide on remand. The Court did indicate,
however, that "these concerns may well provide the necessaryjustifica-
tion for the unannounced entry in this case."212 The Court also re-
fused to consider the State's argument that the exclusion of evidence
from searches made unreasonable by an unannounced entry is not
constitutionally required, because that issue had not been adjudicated
by the Arkansas courts and was outside of the limited issue on which
the Court granted certiorari.
213
V. ANALYSIS
In Wilson v. Arkansas, the Court correctly reversed the Arkansas
Supreme Court's ruling. However, the Court's relegation of the
knock-and-announce requirement to a "factor" in the reasonableness
inquiry undervalues the interests served by the knock-and-announce
rule. The Court came to its determination by looking only at the com-
mon law history of the rule and its exceptions. Although a historical
analysis is useful to a determination of Fourth Amendment reasona-
bleness, an inquiry which looks only at history is inherently incom-
plete, and potentially ignores countervailing modern interests. By
closely examining the history of the knock-and-announce rule, and
balancing the interests involved, this Note concludes that unan-
nounced entries should be presumptively unreasonable. Unan-
nounced entries should only be allowed when a "reasonably prudent
208 Id.
209 Id. at 1918-19. The exceptions listed included situations when announcement would
place police in danger of physical violence, and where police have a reasonable suspicion
that evidence will be destroyed if the police give advance notice of their presence.






officer would be warranted in the belief, based on specific and articul-
able facts, and not on a mere inchoate and unparticularized suspicion
or 'hunch,"'214 that exigent circumstances exist at the site of the
search.
A. THE COURT INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE REASONABLENESS INQUIRY
1. Reasonableness Cannot be Determined Solely by Historical Analysis
The Court's sole reliance upon the common law distorted the test
of reasonableness used to determine the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection against unreasonable searches. While the common
law may "be instructive"215 about or "[shed] light"2 1 6 on the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment, history is only one element out of several
the Court has used to determine the reasonableness of a search.
217
Justice Thomas's method of analysis was described in two key
sentences in his opinion:
In evaluating the scope of [the Unreasonable Search Clause], we have
looked to the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the framing.
Although the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always
that searches and seizures be reasonable, our effort to give content to
this term may be guided by the meaning ascribed to it by the Framers of
the Amendment.218
Justice Thomas gives no authority for the second statement. He sup-
ports the first statement with citations to three cases: California v.
Hodari D.,21 9 United States v. Watson,220 and Carroll v. United States.
221
However, an examination of the three cases shows that in each case
the historical analysis was only a part of a larger overall analysis.
Hodari D. did not address the scope of "unreasonable" searches or
seizures at all. Rather, it addressed the definition of "seizure" as it is
used in the Fourth Amendment.222 The Hodari D. Court discussed the
214 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
215 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217 (1981).
216 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 (1980).
217 The other factors are recounted in the text accompanying notes 35-38, supra
218 Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916 (1995) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
219 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
220 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
221 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
222 In Hodari D., a police officer chased a teen who ran when he saw the policeman's car
approach. While being pursued, the teen threw away what later turned out to be a piece of
crack cocaine. The government admitted that the arrest was unlawful and the only issue
before the Court was whether Hodari had been "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes
at the time he threw away the cocaine. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment was
not implicated because Hodari had not been seized at the time he abandoned the cocaine.
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 622-23, 626.
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common law definition of "arrest," but also considered and rejected
an expansion of the meaning of "seizure" on policy grounds.2 23 The
fundamental problem with Hodari's claim was not that the common
law would not regard a chase as an arrest, but rather that the common
usage of the word "seizure" did not "remotely apply" to the facts of the
case.224 Thus, the historical definition of "arrest" was not the sole ba-
sis for the Court's decision.
Watson, the second case relied upon by the Court, involved the
admissibility of evidence seized after a warrantless arrest by a postal
inspector who admittedly had time to secure a warrant.225 Here, the
Court consulted the common law to show that arrest without a war-
rant was permissible under the Constitution. However, the Court's
finding was heavily influenced by the fact that Congress had given pos-
tal inspectors the authority to make warrantless arrests. 226 The Court
was also swayed by the knowledge that nearly all states allowed war-
rantless arrests for felonies by statute.227 Though the Court did not
engage in balancing to determine reasonableness in Watson, its deci-
sion was based as much, if not more, on current state and federal gov-
ernment statutory law than on the common law arrest power.228
Thus, the Court's method of analysis in Watson is markedly different
from the Court's method of analysis in Wilson, and cannot support a
reasonableness determination based entirely on historical analysis.
Carroll, a prohibition-era case relied upon by the Court, involved
the admissibility of alcohol seized during a warrantless search of an
automobile.229 The Court in Carroll held that a warrantless search of
an automobile was not unreasonable.230 Carroll was a case of first im-
pression, so the Court attempted to determine what "unreasonable
search" meant to the Framers of the Fourth Amendment.231 The
Court, however, also looked to its own analogous precedent and of-
fered a practical argument against using warrants in automobile
223 Id. at 624-27. Cf Wayne R. LaFave, Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous Prey: Whence
Fourth Amendment "Seizures"?, 1991 U. ILL L. REv. 729, 754-6 (listing and criticizing the
propositions made in the majority opinion in Hodari D.).
224 Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626.
225 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 413-14 (1976).
226 Id. at 415-416. "IT]here is a strong presumption of constitutionality due to an Act of
Congress, especially when it turns on what is 'reasonable,' [o]bviously the Court should be
reluctant to decide that a search thus authorized by Congress was unreasonable and that
the Act was therefore unconstitutional." Id. (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,
585 (1948)).
227 Id. at 421-22.
228 See id. at 422-423.
229 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
230 Id. at 149.
231 Id. at 149-153.
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searches: an automobile can be moved out of ajurisdiction in the time
required to secure a warrant.2 32
Both Justices Scalia2 33 and Thomas234 have cited Carroll for the
proposition that "[t] he Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the
light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it
was adopted .... *"235 Both Justices use Carroll to justify an analysis
which regards the meaning of "unreasonable search" in 1791 as dis-
positive of the definition of the phrase "unreasonable searches" in the
Fourth Amendment.2 36 However, the full quote of Carroll's endorse-
ment of historical analysis rejects the use of history as the sole source of
determining reasonableness: "[t] he Fourth Amendment is to be con-
strued in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and
seizure when it was adopted and in a manner which will conserve public
interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens."237 Thus,
none of the cases Justice Thomas cites to support his purely historical
analysis of the knock-and-announce requirement validate the use of
history as the sole guide to determine Fourth Amendment
reasonableness.
2. The Garner Problem
The key problem with using a purely historical analysis of the
Fourth Amendment is that society and law enforcement have changed
substantially since 1791.238 Due to these dramatic changes, reliance
on common law rules can produce "a mistaken literalism that ignores
the purposes of a historical inquiry."239 Tennessee v. Garner illustrates
232 Id. at 147, 153.
233 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2139 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
234 Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1916 (1995).
235 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149.
236 E.g., Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2139 (Scalia, J., concurring).
237 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149 (emphasis added).
238 For example, uniformed police departments were not organized until 1845. Donald
B. Allegro, Police Tactics, Drug Trafficking and Gang Violence: Why the No-Knock Warrant is an
Idea Whose Time Has Come, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 552 n.1 (1989). Also, criminals were not
armed with AK-47s in 1791; weaponry was far less powerful and accurate in 1791. Tennes-
see v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1985).
239 Garner, 471 U.S. at 13. The Court has cautioned against unthinking application of
common law principles to determine the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. E.g., Stea-
gald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217 n.10 (1981) ("Crime has changed, as have the
means of law enforcement, and it would therefore be naive to assume that those actions a
constable could take in an English or American village three centuries ago should neces-
sarily govern what we, as a society, now regard as proper."); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 591 n.33 (1980) ("[T]his Court has not simply frozen into constitutional law those law
enforcement practices that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment's passage.").
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit, in one of the first cases citing Wilson, also warned
against rigidly conforming the Fourth Amendment to practices of the time of the Framers.
Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 1995).
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that the Court will consider societal changes to determine the mean-
ing of "unreasonable search."
Garner involved the constitutionality of a statute which allowed
police to use deadly force to effect an arrest 240 A Tennessee police
officer shot and killed Garner as he fled the scene of a burglary,
although the officer believed Garner was unarmed.241 The Court re-
jected the argument the clear common law rule allowing officers to
kill all fleeing felons was dispositive on the reasonableness ques-
tion.242 Changes in the types of crimes that are considered felonies,
the manner in which felonies are punished, and the types of weaponry
available convinced the Court that following the common law rule
would not serve Fourth Amendment purposes. 243 Therefore, the
Court balanced the "unmatched" intrusion of deadly force against the
state's necessity to use the force, and determined that the use of
deadly force against fleeing felons is allowable only in certain
circumstances. 244
Wilson's historical analysis presents some of the same concerns
found in Garner. For example, the increased sophistication of weap-
onry noted by the Garner court also has implications for the execution
of search warrants. 245 Officers at common law did not have to serve
warrants on suspects armed with automatic weapons. Many people,
particularly in the law enforcement community, argue that the knock-
and-announce rule is an anachronism in light of current dangers. 24
6
In the face of such criticism, a purely historical analysis is a weak basis
of decision. If the Wilson Court was interested in maintaining the pro-
tection of the interests served by the knock-and-announce rule, it
should have demonstrated that the interests served by the rule still
apply in 1995. This type of inquiry requires balancing, rather than
240 Gamer, 471 U.S. at 5-7.
241 Id. at 3-4.
242 Id. at 13.
243 Id. at 1--15. The Court concluded, "[t]hough the common-law pedigree of Tennes-
see's rule is pure on its face, changes in the legal and technological context mean the rule
is distorted almost beyond recognition when literally applied." Id. at 15.
244 Id. at 7-12. The Court also looked to the prevailing trends in relevant state statutes,
as well as local police department policies to determine that the rule was not necessary for
effective law enforcement. Id. at 15-20.
245 Some criminals are armed with military style assault rifles and other automatic weap-
ons. See Allegro, supra note 238, at 560.
246 For example, one commentator writes:
One of the most troublesome requirements regarding [search warrant] execution is
that which requires that notice be given prior to forcible entry.... officers recognize
what the courts call the [anachronism] of the notice rule in an era when the suspect
often has the opportunity to injure the officer or to efficiently dispose of evidence.
JOHN C. KLOrrER, LEGAL GUiDE FOR POLICE: CONSTITUTIONAL IssuEs (3d ed. 1992). Cf.
Allegro, supra note 238, at 562-68.
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merely referencing, the interests involved.
B. THE BALANCING OF INTERESTS FAVORS A STRONGER RULE
The interests protected by the knock-and-announce rule con-
tinue to be relevant today. Unannounced raids by police invade the
personal security interest protected by the Fourth Amendment and
are extremely dangerous to both police and those inside the home.
2 47
The danger to the police comes from several factors. An unan-
nounced entry by officers is a terrifying act to the person being
targeted. Moreover, no-knock raids are often conducted by plain-
clothes officers, increasing the chance that a panicked homeowner
will think that the invaders are criminals. 248 Guns are present in
nearly half of all American homes,249 and nearly all states give home-
owners the authority to use deadly force to protect themselves and
their homes.250 Frightened homeowners with guns may pose a signifi-
cant threat to the safety of police (especially plainclothes police) serv-
ing a warrant.
251
Innocent citizens are also victims of no-knock raids. Mistaken
247 See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 52-53 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
248 SeeJAMES BOVARD, LosT RicHrs 234-37 (1994).
249 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEIT. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJus-
TICE STATISTICS 1993 203, table 2.5 (1994) (49% of Americans nationwide report having a
gun at home).
250 43 states allow the use of deadly force to protect a dwelling. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OFJUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME ANDJuSTiGE 31 (2d ed.
1988) (table with state by state listing of deadly force privilege status). For example, Texas
allows a person to use deadly force to protect land when "when and to the degree he
reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to prevent the other's immi-
nent commission of... burglary...." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.42(2) (A) (West 1994).
A homeowner can rely on this section to defend against a murder of an officer forcibly
entering his house to serve a warrant. SeeVenegas v. State, 660 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Ct. App.
1983).
Similarly, Illinois allows the use of deadly force to protect a dwelling when "[t] he entry
is made or attempted in a violent, riotous, or tumultuous manner, and he reasonably be-
lieves that such force is necessary to prevent an assault upon, or offer of personal violence
to, him or another then in the dwelling. . . ." 720 ILCS § 5/7-2 (1994). Thus, a man
successfully defended a murder charge when he shot plainclothes police officers who came
to serve an arrest warrant at night, and were pounding on his back door. People v. Lavac,
192 N.E. 568 (Ill. 1934).
251 For example, in 1989, in a nighttime raid, Florida police clad in dark clothing and
black masks notified Charles DiGristine that they had a warrant to search his house by
setting off a concussion grenade and breaking down the front door. BovARD, supra note
248, at 236. As his wife screamed, he ran frightened to his bedroom to get his pistol. Id.
An agent ran into his bedroom, and in the exchange of gunfire, the police officer was
killed. Id. DiGristine was tried for the officer's murder but was acquitted. Id. The jury
foreman commented "[h]e was totally petrified, and I would have been too. Myself, under
the same circumstances, would have more than likely done the same thing, if not quicker
and with more firepower." Joe Hallinan, Gestapo-like Tactics Used in Drug Raids, Dss MOINEs
REG., Nov. 6, 1993, at IT, 2T.
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raids are not a rare occurrence, 252 and when an unannounced entry
does occur, innocent people at home can be victimized by nervous
police executing the unannounced entry. For example, SWAT police
broke into Robin Pratt's home unannounced to execute an arrest war-
rant on her husband.253 While searching the apartment, an officer
rounded a corner and came upon Mrs. Pratt.2 54 The SWAT officer
pointed his gun at her and ordered her to get down, and while she
was complying, she looked up at the officer and said, "Please don't
hurt my children."255  The officer then shot and killed Mrs. Pratt.
256
The right to privacy in one's home is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment.257 The Court has emphasized the importance of this
right in a variety of circumstances. 258 Some critics of the knock-and-
announce rule argue that the residents of homes subject to search
under warrant have no real expectation of privacy, since the officers
have the right to enter after the announcement.259 However, this ig-
nores the fact that unannounced entries by police can expose private
and intimate activities of citizens. 260 In addition, because the unan-
252 See Joe Hallinan, Drug Wars: Fervor Often Injures The Innocent, TMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Sept. 26, 1993, at A20 (quoting a DEA official as saying that unsuccessful drug
raids "happen all of the time," and a North Carolina police officer saying that the homes of
innocents are invaded "every day in this business").




257 E.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980); United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (entry of home is "chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed"); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
511 (1961) ("At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.").
258 E.g., United States v.James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 501 (1993)
(civil forfeitures of real property); Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 543 (1992)
(seizure of home); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331, 336 (1990) ("protective sweep" of a
home incident to an arrest); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (warrantless
drunk driving arrest at home); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident
to arrest); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (municipal inspections).
259 Sonnenreich & Ebner, supra note 149, at 647. See also State v. Stevens, 511 N.W.2d
591, 598 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2245 (1995).
260 An unannounced raid can expose people who are engaging in sexual intercourse or
in various states of undress. See supra note 47.
This is especially likely when raids are conducted at night or at early morning hours.
For example, Drug Enforcement Administration agents arrived at the home of Sina Brush
just after dawn in the fall of 1991. Joe Hallinan, Drug Wars: Fervor Often Injures The Innocent,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 26, 1993, at A20. She heard a commotion outside,
and right after she got out of bed to look, the door slammed open and agents flooded into
her home. Id. The agents forced her and her daughter, both of whom were clad only in
underwear, to kneel handcuffed in the middle of their main room while the officers
searched the premises. Id. The officers did not let the women dress. See id. No drugs
were found, but Ms. Brush described the experience thus, "[the officer guarding me in the
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nounced entry is by police, victims of these searches feel a special
sense of violation and fear.261 When police do not know of specific
facts that give them reason to believe that the occupants of a home
will resist the officers or will frustrate the search, the police should not
be allowed to subject citizens to these risks.
The state's primary interest in unannounced entries is that they
allow police to take command of the search scene quickly and effi-
ciently.262  The benefits flowing from this are two-fold. First, it
reduces the opportunity occupants have to destroy evidence. 263 In
many cases, particularly those involving narcotics, the targeted items
are small and easily disposable. 264 However, barging into a home
unannounced is not necessary to prevent destruction of drugs that
may be in that home.265 Less violent alternatives, such as shutting off
the water to the house or using a ruse to gain entry, should be tried
first.266
At heart, this choice of method is an efficiency choice. It is cer-
tainly more efficient for the police to kick in the front door than to
shut off the water to a home or wait to capture the owner outside.
However, efficiency concerns do not necessarily override Fourth
Amendment interests. In fact, the Supreme Court specifically re-
main room] placed himself at an angle where he could see my whole body exposed and he
was just leering at me," she said. "He was sitting there with his hands behind his head and
his feet stretched out in a chair ... and I felt that was a violation of my female self." Id.
261 The Ninth Circuit expressed the terror as follows:
The fear of a smashing in of doors by government agents is based upon much more
than a concern that our privacy will be disturbed. It is based upon concern for our
safety and the safety of our families. Indeed, the minions of dictators do not kick in
doors for the mere purpose of satisfying some voyeuristic desire to peer around and
then go about their business. Something much more malevolent and dangerous is
afoot when they take those actions. It is that which strikes terror into the hearts of
their victims. The [F]ourth [Almendment protects us from that fear as much as it
protects our privacy.
United States v. Becker, 23 F.3d 1537, 1540 (9th Cir. 1994). See also Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson,J., dissenting).
262 Allegro, supra note 238, at 562.
263 State v. Stevens, 511 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Wis. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2245 (1995).
264 Id. Standard plumbing allows an offender to toss drug evidence down the toilet, as
Wilson did in this case. See also United States v. Keene, 915 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (8th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1102 (1991).
265 See Garcia, supra note 84, at 714 (shutting off water, covertly installing mesh in the
pipes to catch drugs, using a ruse to gain entry, and apprehending the owner of the dwell-
ing outside prior to entry).
266 Id. Though the Court has reserved the question of whether entry via ruse violates
the knock-and-announce rule, Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 590 n.7 (1968), the
seven Federal Circuit Courts which have considered the question have unanimously ap-
proved of ruses. E.g., United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432, 435 (1992) (agent
posing as Federal Express delivery driver did not violate knock-and-announce rule). Cf
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1967) (approving of police undercover entry into
drug dealer's home to buy drugs).
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jected an attempt to use an efficiency argument to justify a Fourth
Amendment intrusion in Mincey v. Arizona.267 The Mincey court
strongly stated that "the mere fact that law enforcement may be made
more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth
Amendment."268 Thus, the efficiency argument should not carry any
more weight in the context of an unannounced entry, especially in
light of the interests served by the knock-and-announce rule.
26 9
The second state interest no-knock entries serve is officer safety.
The Court considers the safety of officers serving a valid warrant a
"weighty" interest.270 An officer executing a warrant is most vulnera-
ble when attempting to enter a house.2 71 Although the officer's posi-
tion is often known by those inside, since the officer will probably be
near. a door, the officer does not know the location of the house's
occupants.272 The officer is further disadvantaged by not knowing the
layout of the dwelling, which can provide hiding places for occupants
who are determined to resist.273 Forcing an officer to announce his
presence also can give occupants time to arm themselves and prepare
for confrontation.2 74 To minimize these risks, and to promote the le-
gitimate interest of the state in enforcing drug laws, police claim they
need the discretion to pursue unannounced entries if they feel that is
the safest option.27
5
However, as shown above, 27 6 safety is not necessarily maximized
by allowing officers to enter a house unannounced. Because of the
large security and privacy interests at stake, police should not have
unchecked discretion in this matter.
Maryland v. Buie77 illustrates how the Court may balance the in-
terests of the police against the interests of the occupants of the house
to be searched. In Buie, the Court held that officers could undertake
a "protective sweep" of a suspect's home when serving an arrest war-
rant on a suspect accused of a violent crime. 278 Although allowing
267 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978). See also Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981)
(rejecting inconvenience to law enforcement officers as a justification for a warrantless
arrest of a suspect in the home of a third party).
268 437 U.S. at 393.
269 See supra notes 42-53, 247-60 and accompanying text.
270 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1979) (per curiam).
271 Allegro, supra note 238, at 566.
272 Id.
273 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333 (1990).
274 Allegro, supra note 238 at 566.
275 Id.
276 See supra notes 42-44, 245-51 and accompanying text.
277 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
278 A protective sweep is a cursory visual search incident to arrest, confined to places
where a person posing a danger to police officers can hide. A sweep protects officers
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protective sweeps in some instances, the Court rejected the State's
claim that a sweep is only a de minimis intrusion in the context of an
arrest made pursuant to a warrant.279 The Court used the reasonable
suspicion standard of Terry v. Ohio2 0 to determine when a protective
sweep was constitutional. 281 In Terry, the Court sanctioned a "stop and
frisk" search of a suspect for weapons, where the officer did not have
probable cause to arrest the suspect.282 Teny's standard allows stop
and frisk searches when a reasonable police officer would believe that
he is dealing with a potentially armed and dangerous suspect.283 The
officer's belief must be based on specific and articulable facts, rather
than on an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch."' 284
Buie applied the Terry standard in the context of the protective sweep,
requiring that officers show specific, articulable facts "which, taken to-
gether with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a
reasonably prudent officer" to believe that a person posing a threat is
on the premises.
285
Buie's balancing is appropriate in the knock-and-announce con-
text. Both the protective sweep in Buie and the unannounced entry in
Wilson occurred ancillary to police activity pursuant to a lawful war-
rant. When arrest warrants are served on suspects in violent crimes,
the danger faced by officers is at least as great as that faced by officers
serving a search warrant. The standard police should be required to
meet to justify the intrusion of an unannounced entry should be no
lower than the Buie standard. Thus, unannounced entries should be
presumptively unreasonable. The presumption should be rebuttable
only when the police can show specific, articulable facts that would
allow a reasonable officer in the same situation to conclude that the
occupants of the dwelling are already aware of the officers' authority
and purpose, or that an unannounced entry is necessary for safety or
to prevent the destruction of evidence. This standard respects state
interests because it will allow police to take appropriate measures in
cases where there are facts warranting an unannounced entry.2 86 By
circumscribing police discretion, it protects the security, privacy, and
carrying out a lawful arrest from surprise attack. Id. at 327.
279 Id. at 333-34.
280 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
28] Buie, 494 U.S. at 334.
282 Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
283 Id. at 27.
284 Id. at 27; Buie, 494 U.S. at 332.
285 Buie, 494 U.S. at 334.
286 For example, facts sufficient to meet the Buie standard could come from prior deal-
ings with a suspect, knowledge from a reliable source that the home to be searched is
heavily fortified, or a suspect's threatening behavior at the time of the search.
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property interests of the subject of the search.287
C. HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE SUPPORT A STRONGER RULE
A close look at the common law history of the knock-and-an-
nounce rule and recent Congressional experience with no-knock war-
rants supports a rule of presumptive unreasonableness for no-knock
entries. In the Wilson opinion, Justice Thomas stated that "the Fram-
ers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer's
entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assess-
ing the reasonableness of a search or seizure. '288 This understates the
importance of the announcement rule in the early years of the repub-
lic. First, at common law, the scope of exceptions to the knock-and-
announce rule was very limited.289 All of the early cases with excep-
tions to the knock-and-announce rule cited by Justice Thomas in the
Wilson opinion involve situations where there were clearly specific, ar-
ticulable facts supporting the decision not to announce.290 Moreover,
the strong language of the treatises,291 as well as the very small
number of cases where there was no announcement, strongly suggests
that announcement was the accepted procedure. 292 Indeed, officers
were even liable for large civil damages for violations of the knock-
and-announce rule.29 3 Finally, ten states had statutes requiring
287 The Buie standard would forbid the use of a generalized, blanket profile of a class of
suspects to determine whether a forced entry should be attempted, as is done in some
jurisdictions in drug cases. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 61 (1963) (Brennan,J., con-
curring and dissenting) ("[I)f police experience in pursuing other narcotics suspects justi-
fied an unannounced police intrusion into a home, the Fourth Amendment would afford
no protection at all."); People v. Ouellette, 401 N.E.2d 507, 510-11 (I1. 1979) (rejecting
blanket approach); People v. Gastelo, 432 P.2d 706, 708 (Cal. 1967) (blanket approach
violates Fourth Amendment).
288 Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1918 (1995).
289 See Ker 374 U.S. at 54 (Brennan,J., concurring and dissenting) (common law excep-
tions all have an implied notice requirement).
290 E.g., Mahomed v. The Queen, 4 Moore 239, 13 Eng. Rep. 293 (P.C. 1843) (use of
violence against officers); Allen v. Martin, 10 Wend. 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833) (pursuit);
Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822) (plaintiff threatened to shoot officers who would arrest
him); White & Wiltsheire, 81 Eng. Rep. 709 (KB. 1619) (prior violence against officers
serving process).
291 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
292 Cf Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE LJ. 139, 143 n.20.
293 A manual for justices of the peace in colonial America recounts the following case:
A Man was outlawed for want of an Appearance: The Sheriff came to his House with a
Latiat and with a Capias Utlegatum, without the Privity of the Plaintiff, and the outward
Door being open, he entered; then he and his company shut the Door, and drew their
Swords, and went up to the Chamber where the Man was in Bed, and knocked gently
at the Door, which was lock'd, but did not tell who they were, or for what they came;
but the Door not being immediately opened, they broke it open, and arrested the
Person... but the Sheriff was fined [£200] for this Outrage and Terror, and for not
telling who he was, that the Door might be opened without Violence.




announcement at the time of the framing of the Fourth Amend-
ment.294 The evidence is so compelling that William Cuddihy, the au-
thor of "one of the most exhaustive analyses of the original meaning
of the Fourth Amendment ever undertaken"29 5 has concluded that
unannounced entries were considered unreasonable by the Framers
of the Fourth Amendment.
2 96
Likewise, recent experience has convinced Congress that careful
controls are needed for police conducting unannounced entries. In
order to help fight the drug war, in 1970, Congress passed a contro-
versial statute that allowed judges to issue no-knock warrants.2 97 Dur-
ing the four years that the statute was in force, the Congressional Record
was filled with articles detailing abuses of the no-knock system, and
stories of innocent people killed in no-knock searches. 298 Dissatisfac-
tion and concern over the constitutionality of the statute299 grew until
the statute was repealed in 1974.300 Since that time, even though Con-
gress has remained committed to fighting the drug war, it has never
returned to the no-knock warrant. The experience of the 1970s shows
that unannounced entries must be held in check.
D. THE IMPACT OF TREATING ANNOUNCEMENT AS ONLY A "FACTOR" IN
THE REASONABLENESS ANALYSIS
Treating the presence or absence of an announced entry as a
mere factor in the reasonableness equation gives a wide berth for
judges to apply or ignore the rule as they choose. This will result in
inadequate protection of the interests served by the knock-and-an-
nounce rule. The Court left to the lower courts the task of determin-
ing when a knock is or isn't required under the Fourth
Amendment,301 but did not give those courts any guidance as to how
294 Cuddihy, supra note 7, at 1511-13.
295 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2398 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
296 Cuddihy, supra note 7, at 1511.
297 Comprehensive Drug Abuse, Prevention, and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, § 509(b), 84 Stat. 1236, 1274 (1970).
298 Over 100 articles detailing abuses and mistakes in the execution of unannounced
raids were published in the Congressional Record. See Garcia, supra note 84, at 704-05.
The New York Times made a comprehensive investigation of no-knock entries in 1973, and
reported the stories of a Virginia woman, previously the victim of a burglary, who shot a
police officer who entered her apartment unannounced, and a California man who was
shot by the police while he sat and held his infant child. Andrew H. Malcolm, Vw!ent Drug
Raids Against the Innocent Found Widespread, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1973, at Al.
299 E.g., during the debates leading up to the repeal, Sen. Sam Ervin, the Harvard Law
School-educated former North Carolina Supreme CourtJustice, who led the fight to repeal
the law, argued that the statute was unconstitutional. 120 CONG. REc. 22,884 (1974).
300 Controlled Substances Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-481, § 3, 88 Stat. 1455, 1456
(1974).
301 Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1919 (1995).
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the Fourth Amendment should be applied in the knock-and-an-
nounce context.
In the face of this lack of direction from the Supreme Court,
courts will necessarily look at previous precedent for direction.30 2 For
example, federal courts will look at the case law under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3109, because § 3109 has been construed to apply the common law
announcement requirement and exceptions which formed the basis
of the Court's opinion in Wilson.30 3 Likewise, state knock-and-an-
nounce statutes generally have been read to codify common law re-
quirements. 30 4 Since courts have already been interpreting common
law knock-and-announce requirements, the Court has in effect told
lower courts to continue applying the knock-and-announce rule as
they have done in the past.305 Unfortunately, some courts have been
very lax in enforcing the knock-and-announce rule.3 0 6 Additionally,
the Wilson decision speaks favorably about exceptions to the knock-
and-announce rule.3 0 7 In light of this, and the lack of a strong state-
ment criticizing unannounced entries anywhere in the opinion, lower
302 E.g., Gaston v. City of Toledo, 665 N.E.2d 264, 270 (Ohio CL App. Aug. 25, 1995).
303 See Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1917 n.3 (citing Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 591
n.8 (1968)). Federal circuits addressing the knock-and-announce issue post-Wison have
indeed looked at § 3109 caselaw to determine Fourth Amendment issues. See United States
v. Smith, 63 F.3d 956, 962 (10th Cir. 1995) (cases under § 3109 "provide valid guidance"
on Fourth Amendment claims), vacated on other grounds, 116 S. CL 900 (1996); United
States v. Gatewood, 60 F.3d 248, 252 n.2 (6th Cir.) (dissent finds case law under § 3109
"instructive"), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 546 (1995); United States v.Jewell, 60 F.3d 20, 23 n.2
(1st Cir. 1995) (noting Wilson's and Sabbath's comment about § 3109).
304 State v. Miskimins, 435 N.W.2d 217, 219 n.2 (S.D. 1989) (knock-and-announce stat-
utes codify common law). See also, e.g., Moore v. State, 650 So. 2d 958, 960 (Ala. Crim. App.
1994) (ALA. CODE § 15-5-9 (1990) codifies common law), cert. denied, 115 S. CL 1361
(1995); Belton v. United States, 647 A.2d 66, 67 (D.C. 1994) (same, D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-
565(g) (1993)), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 1383 (1995); People v. Gonzales, 259 Cal. Rptr. 846,
848 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (same, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1531 (West 1989)); State v. Sakellson,
379 N.W.2d 779, 781-82 (N.D. 1985) (same, N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-08 (1990)).
305 See Commonwealth v. Wornum, 656 N.E.2d 579, 581 (Mass. November 3, 1995) (af-
ter determining that an unannounced entry was not unreasonable under common law
principles, the court notes Wilson and states that the entry was not unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment for the same reasons as in the common law analysis).
306 E.g., United States v. Knapp, 1 F.3d 1026, 1030-31 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding no exi-
gent circumstances, but holding a 10 second delay after knocking with no response suffi-
cient to find a constructive refusal under 18 U.S.C. § 3109; forced entry reasonable even
though officers knew Knapp was an amputee who could not move quickly); United States
v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 849-51 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding no exigent circumstances tojustify
a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3109, the court applies a "good faith" exception to knock
requirement).
307 Widson, 115 S. Ct. at 1919 (the state's exigent circumstances arguments "may well
provide the necessaryjustification for the unannounced entry in this case"). Moreover, the
opinion surveys the common law exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule, Id. at 1918-
19, but doesn't survey the policies in favor of the knock-and-announce rule or explain
when an unannounced entry would be unreasonable.
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courts may not be inclined to strengthen their enforcement of the
knock-and-announce rule.308
The future of the knock-and-announce rule is further clouded by
other recent Supreme Court action on the issue. In particular, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in State v. Stevens less than ten days
after the decision in Wilson.309 Stevens issued a blanket rule that police
need never knock-and-announce when they are looking for "evidence
of drug dealing."3 10 The exception in Stevens exempts a large and im-
portant category of searches from the coverage of the knock-and-an-
nounce rule. At a minimum, the denial of certiorari suggests that the
Court does not believe that such a limitation presents a serious Fourth
Amendment problem. Courts that have been loosely applying the
knock-and-announce rule may take the "broad" exceptions in the Wil-
son rule and the denial of certiorari in Stevens as a signal that they may
continue to apply the knock-and-announce rule loosely.
311
VI. CONCLUSION
In Wilson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court held that the knock-
and-announce rule is only one factor in determining whether a search
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Court came to its
determination by looking only at the common law background of the
knock-and-announce rule. In doing so, the Court's decision underval-
ued the important personal security and privacy interests served by
police announcement. A balancing of the interests involved, coupled
with a proper reading of the history of the rule, shows that a stronger
rule is necessary to protect the interests at stake. Instead of making
the knock-and-announce rule a factor in the reasonableness equation,
the Court should have held that unannounced entries into homes are
presumptively unreasonable, unless the police know that the occupant
of the home is aware of their purpose, or the police can show reason-
able suspicion that announcement would lead to violence or the de-
struction of evidence. However, the Court announced the
constitutionality of the rule in such a mild way, and with so little gui-
dance, that the Court's decision leaves important Fourth Amendment
concerns subject to erosion.
MARK JOSEPHSON
308 The Court's holding puts the knock requirement "among the factors to be consid-
ered in assessing the reasonableness of a search." Id. at 1918. The Court says that "in some
circumstances an unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable," but never sug-
gests when that would be the case. Id. (emphasis added).
309 State v. Stevens, 511 N.W.2d 591 (Wis. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2245 (1995).
310 Id. at 597.
311 E.g., Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting Wilson's "broad excep-
tion for exigent circumstances"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 935 (1996).
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